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Voting turnout in Greece: expressive or instrumental?  
 
Abstract  
Voting turnout is a core element of political democracy as it constitutes the so-called 
hard evidence of citizens’ engagement in the wider political processes. Thus, 
increasing voting abstention rates in the developed countries and the emergence of 
abstract types of political and civic engagement raise concerns over the ways in which 
participation evolves in modern democracies and the underlying socio-political 
mechanisms and dynamics that govern its development. Within this context, we 
analyse the micro-level determinants ofvoting turnout rates in Greece using ESV data 
for the 2002-2011 period. In particular, we test for the effects of formal and latent 
political participation, activism and trust  as pointing to either an expressive or 
instrumental voting decision process. After controlling for the individuals’ socio-
demographic and economic profile evidence is found of instrumental voting in 
Greece. Important policy level implications arise as a result of these findings.  
 
Key words: voting turnout; political participation; activism; trust; economic crisis; 
Greece  
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Introduction  
 
Voting is perhaps the single most important evidence of the legitimacy pertaining to a 
democratic regime. As an essential element of participation, voting turnout consitutes 
the signe qua non of democratic elections and a means for people to legally take part 
in collective decision making processes and change their governing officials (Lipset 
1959, Dahl 1982,Lijphart1999,Schmitter and Karl 1991).In that sense, political 
democracy is about regulating the political power held by elites in contrast to non-
elites (Bollen 1980), i.e. it is a synthesis between political freedom and political 
equality (Munck 2016). The quality of democracyis subject to the existing nexus 
between the political system of a society and other characteristics, e.g. the 
modernization process, social justice and a market–based economic system (Lipset 
1959). These characteristcs are actually societal choices and phenomena with 
multifacet causes and consequences (Bollen 1990, Munck and 
Verkuilen2002).Furthermore, they account for the difference between democracy and 
democratic standards, i.e. the difference between formal rule of law and socio-
political and economic outcomes (Lipset 1959, Hewitt 1977, Dahl 1984, Gastil 1987, 
Munck 2016).  
Participation in that sense is a critical element of democracy as operationalised in 
practice, since it practically safeguards political freedom and political equality from 
turning into mere formalities (Munck 2016). When the majority of citizens have the 
power to change the status quo, then democracy carries the most desirable properties 
of stability, legitimacy and effectiveness (Lipset 1959, Dahl 1982, Lijphart 1999, 
Schmitter and Karl 1991, Munck 2016).These properties contribute to socio-economic 
welfare as different individual preferences are matched via elections(Lipset 1959, 
Schmitter and Karl 1991). Given that electoral participation may fluctuate alongside 
national contexts (e.g. compulsory voting, political system), types of elections, and 
time, important insights might be provided via country level evidence regarding the 
individuals’ decision to participate in national elections.  
From the early 1980’s onwards, voting abstention rates in Greece constnatly 
increase at a slow albeit standard rate. This fact indicates the presence of a possibly 
persistent trend that merits deeper analysis. Political rights and political liberties in 
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Greece are sufficient to characterise the country as a fair and stable political 
democracy(Danopoulos 2017). Nevertheless, increasing abstention rates point to a 
legitimization cricis that most probably relates to the wider civic culture qualities of 
the Greek society (Daskalopoulou 2018a). Thus, the analysis of the various political, 
social and economic factors as predictors of voting turnout in different societies bears 
important insights. To that extent the present study analyses the effect of civic culture 
features on the probability of voting turnout in Greece. In particular, the present study 
has a twofold aim. First, we are interested in scetching the profile of voters (compared 
to non-voters) in order to identify the socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
of people who are more likely to participate in this crucial democratic legitimisation 
process. The second aim relates to identifying the possible effect that formal and 
latent political participation forms, activism and trust might excersise upon an 
individual’s decision to participate in elections in Greece. Taken together these voting 
determinants will allow us to differentiate between expressive participation (acts 
motivated by sense of identity and obligation to neighbors, community etc.) and / or 
instrumental participation(acts motivated by the functional and political concerns of 
people such as protect personal investments and promote local businesses etc.) (Dahl 
1984, Talo and Mannarini 2015) as the underlying motive of voting turnout in Greece.  
As reagards the study’s contribution two points need to be made. First, the 
suggested analysis is unique for Greece as no previous study has been performed in 
this area and will thus provide us with important information reagrding people’s 
motives with regard to electoral participation. The second contribution relates to the 
study’s relevance for policy analysis and design. During the past decades Greece has 
made important achievements with regard to its integration in European Union (EU) 
regulation framework and procedures. Nevertheless, the country’s socio-economic 
and institutional basis has proven unable to handle the impact of the financial crisis 
while the governmental authorities and political organisations have largely failed to 
gain widespread support for the necessary structural changes that might ensure 
Greece’s sustainable socio-economic development (Bitros 2013, Bitros and 
Karayiannis 2013).A period of profound assymetry between individual motives and 
policy objectives seems be at hand. A clearer understanding of the motives underlying 
political participation procedures and the content of consent attributed to voting is 
crucial as for the country to be able to build stronger institutions that will help her 
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address future challenges (Baltas 2013, Bitros 2015). Here we assume that knowledge 
on the potentially expressive or instrumental voting character of features such as 
formal and informal participation, activism and trust might enhance our understanding 
of how to build social consensus via actively supporting the key societal decision 
making mechanisms of voting participation. The empirical analysis is based on ESV 
data referring to the 2002-2011period for Greece. Analysis differentiates between the 
pre and the post cricis periods and yields important evidence with regard to the profile 
of voters and the instrumental nature of their voting participation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Part 2 is devoted to a brief 
presentation of the study’s theoretical context. Part 3 presents the model and data. Part 
4 presents the results and Part 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of the study’s 
findings. 
 
Theoretical Context: The Democracy – Participation Relationship   
Political democracy is a synthesis between political freedom and political 
equalityrules that areset forth in order to facilitate collective decision making in the 
presence of different preferences(Lipset 1959, Munck 2016). It is a political system 
‘… which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing 
officials’ (Lipset 1959, p. 71), and regulates the difference in political power held by 
elites and non-elites (Bollen, 1980). Furthermore, constitutional democracy carries 
stability, legitimacy and effectiveness because it is the vehicle for achieving the wider 
socio-economic goals of a society (Lipset 1959, Dahl 1982, Lijphart 1999, Schmitter 
and Karl 1991). To that extent, political democracy is inexorably linked to social and 
economic goals but it is not identical to social democracy and/or economic democracy 
(Lipset 1959, Hewitt 1977, Dahl 1982, Gastil 1987). Socio-economic concerns often 
enter the discussion regarding the quality of a democracy, an issue which relates 
directly to the nexus between the political system and other societal choices such as, 
the modernization process of societies, social justice and a market–based economic 
system (Bollen 1990, Munck and Verkuilen 2002). 
According to Schmitter and Karl (1991, p. 83) we might identify political 
democracy through the presence of key democratic institutions such as a) consensus, 
i.e. people’s degree of agreement with substantive political actions and the role of the 
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state, b) participation, i.e. rules supporting active and equal participation in politics 
should one wishes to, c) access, i.e. equal opportunities of groups to express their 
preferences, d) responsiveness, i.e. rulers must be held accountable for their actions 
through regular and fair processes, and e) parliamentary sovereignty, i.e. the 
legislature must not be the only body that makes rules or even be the only body with 
the final authority to decide which laws are binding. These democratic 
insitutionsappear through an immense variety of empirical manifestations(Munck 
2016). The crucial role of the social environment of politics is clearly evidenced in the 
cross national differences indemocracy. We might categorise the origins of these 
differences into four wide areas. The first one relates to cross natinal differences in 
the political system and the legitimacy of a country’s institutions (e.g. confidence in a 
country’s government and parliament) (Klingemann 1999, Karp, Banducci& Bowler 
2003, Aarts & Thomassen 2008, Ariely 2015). The second one relates to the type and 
stock of social capital and in particular trust and solidarity as key societal features 
(Fukuyama 2001, 2014, Putnam 1995, Newton 1997, Marozzi2015). The third area of 
differences among countries relates to the role of mass mediaand their interaction with 
the society(Newton 1997, Fukuyama 2014, Ceron and Memoli 2016). Finally, the 
fourth area relates to differences in what is known as abstract types of civic 
participationand engagement or else disengagement which is thought to be a genuine 
and active style of participation in modern economies (Ekman & Amnå 2012, Talò & 
Mannarini 2015). Thus, citizenship and the decision making standards in a democracy 
evolve through societal characteristics such as mutual trust, fairness and the 
willingness to compromise, trust in institutions, civil organizations and social 
movements, and so on, or else, ‘civic culture’(Dahl 1984, Schmitter & Karl 1991, 
Bollen 1990, Newton 1997, Norris 2001, Fukuyama2001, Yamagishi 2001).  
Given the democratic legitimization power of political participation, the 
developed countriesview the increasingly declining turnout rates in their national (and 
supranational) electorates as an unexpected ‘paradox’ (Powell 
1986,Flickinger&Studlar 1992). Cross country evidence have come to analyze the 
phenomenon and suggest that electoral participation is affected by the quality of 
institutions underlying a democratic regime, e.g. the role of mass media freedom and 
political representation, socio-demographic characteristics and political preferences, 
economic conditions and the political system (Matsusaka 
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1995,Feddersen&Pesendorfer 1996,Sobbrio& Navarra 2010, Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 
2012, Birch 2018).Summarizing the common ground in the field, a number of studies 
suggest that voting turnout is influenced by a great number of factors which might be 
distinguished into three wide sets namely, the socio–economic environment, 
institutions, and party systems (Powell 1986,Blais&Dobrzynska 1998,Franklin 
2001,Grönlund&Setälä 2007). While acknowledging these three sets of factors as 
crucial in determining turnout, their variation across national and supranational 
contexts suggests that we are still far from a thorough understanding of why people 
vote. At the theoretical level, macro approaches lack a plausible theory of human 
motivation that might be used to provide comprehensive explanations of electoral 
participation thus leading to a general aggregate level theory (Lane &Ersson 1990). 
Indeed, differences in institutional arrangements and cultural factors account for 
cross-national variation in voter turnout rates (Jackman & Miller 1995).Through a 
meta-analysis that assesses the empirical evidence of 83 aggregate-level studies Geys 
(2006) argues that we indeed lack a ‘core’ model of voter turnout. On the other hand, 
micro level studies increasingly point to the need to further analyze the role of 
differences in political preferences, institutions and the socio-economic environment 
in order to acquire more comprehensive knowledge of such phenomena as voting 
turnout. Indicative are the findings of Sobbrio and Navarra (2010) who stress that 
political preferences and education seem to play a significant role in the likelihood of 
‘communicating voting’ and this expression is different between left-wing and right – 
wing voters (Sobbrio& Navarra 2010). Similarly, in theirindividual levelstudy 
GrönlundandSetälä (2007), analyzeinstitutional trust, and in particular trust in 
parliament, as a key determinant that increases the likelihood of voting.  
In the present study we analyze voting turnout in Greece using individual level 
data that will allow us to determine the role of socio-demographic and economic 
conditions as well as the role of individual level preferences over institutions and the 
political system of the country. Availableknowledge includes very few studies 
regarding the determinants of voting in Greece. At the macro level of analysis, 
indicative is the study of Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1991) who extent the 
‘rational partisan model’ to introduce the role of inflation and unemployment 
dynamics as voter determinants. More recently, the study of Nezi (2012) uses 
individual level data to test for the ‘grievance asymmetry’ hypothesis in relation to 
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support for the incumbent party. Other studies deal with the role of mass media in 
voting and voting intentions in Greece (Papagiannidis, Coursaris&Bourlakis 2012) 
and the role of subjective individual perceptions in economic voting (Freire & Costa 
Lobo 2005).  
Here, we follow Dahl (1984) and Talo and Mannarini (2015) and we try to 
differentiate between expressive participation (acts motivated by sense of identity and 
obligation to neighbors, community etc.) and instrumental participation (acts 
motivated by the functional and political concerns of people such as protect personal 
investments and promote local businesses etc.) as determinants of voting turnout in 
the case of Greece. To do so we set a twofold aim that consists of: 1) scetching the 
socio-demographic and economic profile of voters (compared to non-voters) and, 2) 
identifying the possible effect that formal and latent political participation, activism 
and trust might excersise upon an individual’s decision to participate in elections in 
Greece. Taken together these two sets of voting determinants will allow us to draw 
more informative conclusions regarding the individulas that are more likely to 
participate in such a crucial democratic legitimisation process such as parliamentary 
elections.  
Voting turnout in Greece is compulsory. This is a quite important 
characteristic of the Greek democracy since in terms of political democracy 
mandatory electoral participation is a fair insitution, an equitable and effective 
coordination device to support for the provision of democracy as a public good (Birch 
2018). Thus, both political and socio-economic equality are to be expected as the 
outcomes of a democracy (Birch 2018). With constantly decreasing voting turnout 
rates in Greece concern has grown over the key aspects of our democracy such as 
legitimization and representation. Assessing the quality of democracy in post-1974 
Greece
1, Danopoulos (2017) concludes that the country’s quality of democracy is fair, 
but is in need of improvement, while Daskalopoulou (2018a) reports low individual 
level rates of satisfaction with democracy in Greece that depend largely upon the 
perceived quality of civil institutions in the country. As Figure 1 shows voting 
abstention in parliamentary elections in Greece has more than doubled in the last four 
decades,from 20,46% in 1974 to 43,43% in 2015. Within this context we analyse the 
individual level motivation and mobilisation determinants of voting turnout in Greece 
by means of testing the following hypotheses:  
9 
 
H1. The socio-demographic and ecoomic characteristics of respondents affect 
their voting turnout decision.  
H2. Formal political participation will excersise a statsically significant and 
positive (negative) effect on the probability of voting. 
H3. Latent political participation will exercise a statistically significant and 
positive (negative) effect upon the probability of voting if it operates as 
complementary (subsitute) to formal political participation. 
H4. Activism will exercise a statistically significant and positive (negative) 
effect upon the probability of voting if it operates as complementary 
(subsitute) to formal political participation. 
H5. Trust will exercise a statistically significant and positive (negative) effect 
upon the probability of voting.  
The presence and the sign of the above described effects is expected to provide us 
with important insgights as regards the individuals’ expectations, perceptions, and the 
overall motivation and mobilization factors that underlie their decision to vote. H1 is 
considered the benchamrk model that controls for the socio-demograpic and economic 
characteristics of individulas which together with H2-H5 will provide us with 
important information about the profile of voters and the importance of economic or 
expressive considerations in this decision.  
 
Empirical Model and Data  
The Model  
As explained in the previous part, the aim is to identify those factors that will 
enhancethe probability that an individual participates in elections. Thus, a person’s 
decision to vote may be modeled as a binary (dichotomous) dependent variable of the 
form: 
 
1,if person  voted
 
0,  otherwise
i
y

 

(1)  
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where, y is the dependent variable denoting voters and non-voters amongst those that 
are eligible to vote.In principle, any continuous probability distribution defined over 
the real line will suffice as to obtain consistent predictions of the probability of the 
outcomes expressed in equation (1) (Greene 1997). Either a normal distribution 
(probit model) or a logistic distribution (logit model) can be used to model the above 
outcomes. The two distributions are expected to give similar predictions unless the 
sample contains very few responses/non-responses (i.e. very few values of Y equal to 
1 or Y equal to 0) and/or there is wide variation in an important independent variable 
(Greene 1997, Amemiya 1981). In our case there is a very large difference in the 
percentage of voters compared to that of non-voters (see Table 1 in section 3.2) so we 
have chosen to use a logistic distribution. In that case we get a logit model of the 
form: 
   
'
'
'Prob 1
1
x
x
e
y x
e


   

                                                      (2) 
where  .  indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function, x is a vector 
ofexplanatory variables, and   is a set of corresponding parameters that reflect the 
impact of changes in x on the probability ofy*. The goodness of fit measures usually 
reported are the percent correctly predicted and various pseudo-R squared measures, 
the most often cited being the likelihood-ratio test statistic suggested by McFadden 
(1974). Here, we report the log likelihood value (-2LL) which tests for the 
significance of the explanatory variables model (full model) compared to the 
null model, two pseudo-R
2
 values
2
 that tell us approximately how much variation in 
the outcome is explained by the model and, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test of the 
goodness of fit, whichis aChi-square (X
2
) test of whether or not the model is an 
adequate fit to the data
3
. However, it should be noted that goodness-of-fit measures in 
the case of binary response models is not as important as statistical and economic 
significance of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2002, Estrella 1998). A final 
note refers to the interpretation of the logit model coefficinets. The estimated  ’s 
indicate the amount of increase (or decrease, if the sign of the coefficient is negative) 
in the predicted log odds of Y = 1 that would be predicted by a 1 unit increase (or 
decrease) in the predictor, holding all other predictors constant.Thus, in the case of the 
logit model the slope coefficient Bis interpreted as the rate of change in the "log odds" 
of the dependent variable (Y)as an independent variable (X) changes. Because this 
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explanation is not very intuitive it is acustomed to compute the more 
intuitiveexpB which is the effect of the independent variable on the odds ratio
4
. Odds 
ratios equal to 1 mean that there is a 50/50 chance that the event will occur with a 
small change in the independent variable. When the odds ratio is greater than 1, it 
describes a positive relationship and an odds ratio less than 1 implies a negative 
relationship. 
 
Data and Variabels  
The sample consists of a total number of 9,740 observations obtained from the four 
ESV waves that are available for Greece (ESV Waves 1-2002, 2-2006, 4-2008 and 5-
2011).A usable sample of 9,135 observations consisting of the respondents that are 
eligible to vote, has been selected.Voters represent 81.6% of the sample (7,863 obs.) 
and non-voters represent 13.9% of the sample (1,272 obs.) (Table 1). 
Our dependnet variable is a binary one taking the value of 1 if the respondent 
has voted in the last national elections and 0 if he/she hasn’t. The independent 
variables have been divided into five sets of factors referring to: 1
st
) the socio-
economic and demographic profile of the respondents (lnAge, lnEducation, Gender, 
Children, Lives with husband/wife/partner at household grid, Household Income, 
Income satisfaction), 2
nd
)their pattern of formal political participation (Worked in 
political party or action group last 12 months, Member of political party, Contacted 
politician or government official last 12 months), 3
rd
) their pattern of latent political 
participation (Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties, How interested in 
politics, TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday), 4
th
) their 
pattern of activism (Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months, Signed 
petition last 12 months, Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months, 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months, Worked in another organisation or 
association last 12 months), 5
th
) the individuals’ level of generalized and institutional 
trust (Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful, Trust in country's 
parliament, Trust in the legal system, Trust in the police, Trust in the European 
Parliament, Trust in the United Nations). Finally, wave dummies have been used to 
test for the presence of time structural breaks in our model. Table 2 presents the 
definition and measurement of variables as well as basic descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample and the voters and the non-voters sub-samples.  
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Results  
Table 3 summarizes the results from the empirical estimation of equation 1. As the 
summary statistics show model 1 referring to the whole period under study presents a 
very satisfactory fit to the data and can thus be used as reference point in the analysis 
of the predictors of voting turnout in Greece. However, since there is a structural 
break in the model, evidenced by the statistically significant sign of the 2011 wave 
dummy, we have split the sample into the pre and post crisis periods and run models 2 
and 3. Before we proceed to the presentation of these results we need to first point 
that the break in our model is positive suggesting that the probability of voting 
increased in that period. Comparing the results of models 2 and 3 we see that the 
socio-economic and demographic profile of voters in the two periods is different (H1 
is confirmed). This difference relates to the effect of gender, education and income 
between the pre and post crisis periods. In particular, in the pre crisis period the 
probability of voting turnout decreases with age, marriage, children and income. In 
contrast, in the post crisis period the probability of voting turnout increases with 
gender (male) and income and decreases with age, education, marriage and income 
satisfaction. The difference in the profile of voters in the two periods bears some 
important evidence. In the pre crisis period we might discern a trend of abstention 
characterising the household type of voters (older, married people with children in the 
family). In the post crisis period we see that voting turnout is more likely to occur for 
male respondents of higher income while the probability decreases again for older, 
well educated and married respondents that are satisfied with their household income 
level.  
 As regards the effect of political participation on the probability of voting 
results show that it matters in both periods but its effect is negative (H2 is confirmed). 
More specifically, formal political participation in the form of political contacts 
decreases the probability of voting and this is observed in both the pre and the post 
crisis period. The same negative effects are observed in the case of latent political 
participation which has been found to also negatively affect the probability of voting 
turnout in both periods (H3 is confirmed). As shown, the probability of voting 
decreases for those respondents who feel closer to a particular party and show higher 
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levels of interest in politics. Results regarding the effect of activism in voting turnout 
suggest that it matters and its effect is differentiated between the two periods (H4 is 
confirmed). In the pre crisis period the probability of voting increases for respondents 
which have boycottedcertain products and decreases for the respondents who have 
particpated in petitions. In the post crisis period only demonstrations matter and in 
fact in a negative way that is the provability of voting decreases for those who have 
participated in lawful public demonstrations. Finally, as regards the effect of trust on 
the probability of voting turnout we see that generalised trust does not affect the 
decision to vote while institutional trust is a voting predictor (H5 is confirmed). What 
is even more important however is the fact that institutional trust in the pre crisis 
period is important positive voting predictor forthose who trust the legal system  and 
suprannational institutions such as the UN, while it is a negative voting predictor for 
those who trust the police and the EU. Finally, the last also important finding is that in 
the post crisis period only trust in the legal system matters, i.e. it is a positive voting 
predictor.  
 Table 4 summarizes the estimated B’s which can be used to discern the most 
powerful voting predictors in terms of the impact of the statistically significant 
variables of the models on the probability of voting turnout in the pre and post crisis 
periods.Values larger than 1 indicate a positive effect and variables lower than 1 
indicate a negative effect. So, in the pre crisis period almost all variables are found to 
be negative predictors of the probability of voting and the only positive impacts come 
from boycottage actions (which have the largest positive effect), trust in the legal 
system and trust in the UN. In the post crisis period a different picture is observed. 
Now the probability of voting increases for male respondents, with higher incomes 
and higher levels of trust in the legal system which is the only positive predictor 
which is found important in both periods of the analysis. This difference in the profile 
of voters in the two periods suggests a change in the underlying motivation processes, 
a quite important issue that is discussed in more detail in the last section of the study.   
A final note that should be made at this point refers to the robustness of the 
current findings. In particular we have tested for the possible sensitiveness of our 
results in the presence of other important variables related to the respondents’s: a) 
employment status and type of employment; b) political beliefs(position on the left to 
right scale, trust in politicians, trust in political parties); c) use of other sources of 
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information about politics (newspaper reading, politics/current affairs on average 
weekday, and/or radio listening, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday); 
and d) abstract forms of engagement (feelings about politics, e.g.politics too 
complicated to understand, difficulty in making mind up about political issues) 
(Ceron&Memoli 2016,Daskalopoulou 2018b,Talò&Mannarini 2015,  Ekman & Amnå 
2012). Our results are robust as none of these variables have been found to exert a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of voting turnout. This in turn is 
crucial as to the conclusions of the current study with regard to our main research 
question, i.e. the expressive or instrumental character of voting turnout in Greece. 
This discussion is presented in the last section of the study along with a discussion 
about the policy relevance of the current findings as well as a discussion about the 
limitations of the study and issues for further research.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
The present study aims at identifying the determinants of voting turnout in Greece 
using European Social Values Survey data for the 2002-2011 period and a binary 
dependent variable model. Five empirical hypotheses are formed and tested in the 
context of the study and in particular we test for: a) the socio-demographic and 
ecoomic characteristics that affect the respondents’ voting turnout decision; b) the 
effect of formal political participation processes on on the probability of voting; c) the 
effect of latent political participation processes on the probability of voting; d) the 
effect of activism on the probability of voting; and e) the effect of trust (generalised 
and insittuional) on the probability a person decides to vote. The analysis controls for 
the structural break observed in the model after the onset of the economic crisis in the 
country and particularly after the enforcement of the first financial consolidation 
measures. The analysis provides support to the sketch of two different profiles that are 
compatible with a backward turn, or perhaps a delay, in the democratic modernization 
process of Greece. More specifically, in the pre crisis period we see that the voters are 
people who value contemporary forms of civil engagement (boycottage), and trust in 
formal national and supranational insuttuions. Along with the negative signs of all 
other statistically significant variables and especially the socio-demographic variables 
and the political paticipation variables we might argue that there seems to be a trend 
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of political distrust (or a more apolitical stance) for older, married respondents who 
consider other forms of civil engagement, e.g. petitions, as a subsittute to standard 
civil participation processes, (the latter enhanced by the positive role of factors that 
also suggest a movement away from traditional forms of civic engagement, e.g. 
boycottage), while they appreciate the legal system and suprannational institutions 
like the UN. In the post crisis period the profile of voters is different. Now some of 
the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of individuals are important as 
we see that gender and income are strong positive predictors of voting in that period. 
Of the other variables only trust in the legal system matters positively. Thus, we might 
argue that there is differentiated stance after the onset of the financial consolidation 
measures which has caused higher income male respondents to increase their voting 
rates while again appreciating formal institutions. Taken together the evidence for the 
two periods support the argument that citizens vote in accordance with instrumental 
voting. People decide on the basis of income, and socio-economic equality and safety 
considerations as embedded in trust in the leagl system. A final issue that should be 
noted here refers to the robustness of our results in the presence of other variables that 
could be of potential importance in the voting decision.  
The above mentioned results bear important implications in terms of policy 
analysis in the field and in particular in terms of building strong institutions that might 
provide the societal consensus that is detrimental for the success of measures that are 
taken in order to effectively deal with the crisis. Modern democracies asdefined by 
Newton (1997) are the third evolution step ofa democratic regime
5
, a step in which 
abstract types of trust will prevail and thus a challenge will be at hand to identify the 
cognitive mobilization mechanisms that will be at work in this phase of a society’s 
overall development process. Fukuyama (2001, 2014) makes similar observations 
about the abstract types of engagement in modern democracies and highlights just 
how important is for a state to avoid actions that will destroy a society’s stock of 
social capital. In particular, he suggests that a society’s stock of trust can be destroyed 
by a state that is inefficient in the provision of necessary public goods, and 
particularly property rights and public safety, and in controlling the state’s 
involvement in market activities (Fukuyama 2001).  
In terms of its political regime, Greece might be considered a stable and 
mature constitutional democracy organized as a Parliamentary Republic that sustains 
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fair political rights and liberties to her citizens (Danopoulos 2017). Nevertheless, 
increasing abstention rates point to a legitimization cricis that most probably relates to 
the wider civic culture qualities of the Greek society (Bitros 2013, Daskalopoulou 
2018a). In particular, rent seeking activities, government inefficiency and partisan 
politicshave built change resistant barriers (Bitros 2013). To that extent it is important 
to verify that in the case of Greece,the voting decision seems to have a strong 
instrumental character. Income matters and citizens seem to move away from political 
institutions but they turn to the legal system (the equality and safety provider) and/or 
to alternative forms of engagement such as public demonstrations. To that extent the 
future might bring about a combination of reactions / trends towards voting which 
will reflect either an increase in commitment to vote as the ultimate instrument of 
participation, and / or a trend towards a more apolitical (pathetic) stance, and / or a 
trend towards alternative forms of civic engagement  (non-standard, abstract forms of 
engagement). The current findings suggest that such mechanisms are present in the 
Greek society and they merit attention and future research. 
The present findings are important also in terms of policy analysis in the field. 
The importance of economic considerations for voting participation clearly indicate 
that citizens’ support to state regime is interlinked with growth and prosperity 
prerequisites. This in turn, adds complexity to an existing backward spiral that 
commenced with the onset of the financial crisis, and the measures employed to 
address it, and continuous to exacerbatein the presence of other socio-economic 
challenges and phenomena such as unemployment and exploitation in the workplace, 
migration, rising crime and insecurity etc. (Pantazidou 2013,Voulgarelli-Christidou 
2016).Furthermore, the economic and democratic depression currently experienced in 
Greece (Bellucci, Lobo & Lewis-Beck 2012)coincides with thecitizens’ deeper 
knowledge and understanding of how country level decisions are transferred to 
European Union and taken therein in favor of an enlarged but not necessarily 
integrated EU community (Baltas2013,Bitros2015). To the extent that Greece has still 
important work to do in terms of implementing the measures agreed under its bailout 
package and forwarding the deepening of structural reforms, widespread societal 
consensus is required as these measures will be coming in a ‘tired’ socioeconomic 
context that is difficult to provide consent to inefficient, unfair and unproductive 
measures such as the ones implemented in the last years. 
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Endnotes:  
1. In 1974, democracy has been restored in Greece after the collapse of the 
dictatorship that ruled the country from 1967.  
2. The versions are the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke tests which are again used 
as approximations since they vary significantly depending on sample size and 
specification (Cox & Snell 1989, Nagelkerke 1991). 
3. The null hypothesis is that the model is a ‘good enough’ fit to the data 
(p=>.05) and we will only reject this null hypothesis, i.e. the model is a ‘poor’ fit, 
if p<.05. The test is subject to sample size and the inclusion of interactions in the 
data so again it should be considered as an approximation (Hosmer &Lemeshow 
2013). 
4. The odds ratio is the probability of the event divided by the probability of the 
nonevent. For example, if expB1 =2, then a one unit change in the independent 
variable X1 would make the event twice as likely (.67/.33) to occur. For more 
details see: UCLA, SCG. Available at: https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/modules/sas-
learning-moduleintroduction-to-the-features-of-sas/.   
5. Newton (1997) describes a ‘continuum of democracy’ that evolves alongside a 
mature process of the interrelationship between political democracy and types of 
trust in a society. As he argues, the first step is primary democracies, which 
depend on thick trust, i.e. direct political participation prevails, and the second 
step is Tocquevillean civil virtue democracies, which depend on thin trust, i.e. 
weak ties and links prevail (Newton 1997).  
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Figure 1. Voting abstention in parliamentary elections in Greece since 1974. 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Parliamentary elections data available at: 
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-
Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/ 
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Table 1.Distribution of voters and non-voters in the sample.    
 
Wave 1 
Wave  
2 Wave 4 Wave 5 
Total 
Voters  2,139 2,050 1,692 1,982 7,863 
Non-voters  248 229 252 543 1,272 
Not eligible to vote 167 126 125 187 605 
Total  2,554 2,405 2,069 2,712 9,740 
Total usable sample  2,387 2,279 1,944 2,525 9,135 
Source: Own calculations using ESV data for Greece.  
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Table 2. Definition, measurement and basic descriptive statistics for the whole 
sample and the voters and the non-voters sub-samples.  
 
Variable definition and 
measurement  
Basic descriptive statistics 
All Voters Non-Voters 
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Socio-demographic and economic       
lnAge, Age of respondent, 
calculated (13-98) 
48.20 18.63 50.57 17.48 43.17 20.70 
lnEducation, Years of full-time 
education completed (0-28) 
10.56 4.49 10.44 4.63 11.06 4.21 
Gender (0-1, 1=male) .44 .50 .44 .50 .42 .49 
Children (0-1, 1=Yes)  .41 .49 .43 .50 .30 .46 
Lives with husband/wife/partner at 
household grid (0-1, 1=Yes) 
.60 .49 .65 .48 .42 .49 
Household Income, in twelve 
income categories (1-12) 
4.82 2.21 4.89 2.21 4.50 2.21 
Income satifaction,  feeling about 
household income (0-3) 
1.35 .89 1.37 .89 1.26 .88 
Formal political participation       
Worked in political party or action 
group last 12 months (0-1, 1=Yes) 
.04 .21 .05 .22 .02 .12 
Member of political party (0-1, 
1=Yes) 
.06 .24 .07 .25 .01 .12 
Contacted politician or government 
official last 12 months (0-1, 1=Yes) 
.12 .32 .13 .34 .04 .20 
Latent political participation       
Feel closer to a particular party than 
all other parties (0-1, 1=Yes) 
.51 .41 .58 .49 .23 .42 
How interested in politics (0-3) 0 = 
not at all interested 
1.05 .95 1.12 .95 .78 .90 
TV watching, news/politics/current 
affairs on average weekday (0-7) 
1.81 1.47 1.90 1.47 1.47 1.43 
Activism       
29 
 
Worn or displayed campaign 
badge/sticker last 12 months (0-1, 
1=Yes) 
.03 .17 .03 .17 .02 .13 
Signed petition last 12 months (0-1, 
1=Yes) 
.04 .21 .05 .21 .03 .17 
Taken part in lawful public 
demonstration last 12 months (0-1, 
1=Yes) 
.06 .25 .07 .25 .05 .23 
Boycotted certain products last 12 
months (0-1, 1=Yes) 
.10 .30 .10 .31 .10 .31 
Worked in another organisation or 
association last 12 months (0-1, 
1=Yes) 
.05 .22 .05 .23 .02 .15 
Generalized and institutional 
trust  
      
Most people can be trusted or you 
can't be too careful (0-10) 
3.87 2.40 3.81 2.40 4.05 2.39 
Trust in country's parliament (0-10) 3.74 2.74 3.82 2.74 3.01 2.64 
Trust in the legal system (0-10) 5.07 2.90 5.10 2.88 4.55 2.92 
Trust in the police (0-10) 5.51 2.87 5.61 2.84 4.84 2.97 
Trust in the European Parliament 
(0-10) 
4.43 2.82 4.48 2.80 3.71 2.78 
Trust in the United Nations (0-10) 3.74 2.79 3.72 2.76 3.36 2.70 
Source: Own calculations using ESV data for Greece.  
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Table 3. Logistic regression results of the determinants of voting turnout. 
 Model 1. 
2002-2011 
Model 2. 
2002-2008 
Model 3. 
2011 
Variable  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 
Intercept   2.749
***
 
(.651) 
3.422
***
 
(.886) 
2.634
***
 
(1.009) 
Socio-economic and demographic        
lnAge -.800
*** 
(.133) 
-.944
***
 
(.178) 
-.614
***
 
(.208) 
 lnEducation -.235
**
 
(.114) 
-.145 
(.153) 
-.361
**
 
(.179) 
Gender .074 
(.092) 
-.100 
(.122) 
.299
**
 
(.143) 
Children    -.313
***
 
(.108) 
-.443
***
 
(.149) 
-.180 
(.163) 
Lives with husband/wife/partner at household grid -.527
***
 
(.103) 
-.523
***
 
(.139) 
-.541
***
 
(.158) 
Household Income -.004 
(.023) 
-.082
**
 
(.033) 
.075
**
 
(.035) 
Income satisfaction  -.096
*
 
(.059) 
.021 
(.079) 
-.225
***
 
(.090) 
Formal political participation        
Worked in political party or action group last 12 
months 
-.060 
(.398) 
.196 
(.434) 
-.881 
(1.087) 
Member of political party -.546 
(.362) 
-.407 
(.419) 
-1.061 
(.758) 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 
months 
-.510
***
 
(.203) 
-.548
**
 
(.261) 
-.659
**
 
(.335) 
Latent political participation        
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties -1.191
***
 
(.108) 
-1.119
***
 
(.132) 
-1.417
***
 
(.204) 
How interested in politics -.204
***
 
(.058) 
-.186
**
 
(.079) 
-.239
***
 
(.090) 
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TV watching. news/politics/current affairs on 
average weekday 
-.029 
(.036) 
-.053 
(.050) 
-.019 
(.055) 
Activism       
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 
months 
-.258 
(.474) 
.130 
(.526) 
-1.098 
(1.084) 
Signed petition last 12 months -.355 
(.316) 
-1.024
**
 
(.461) 
.513 
(.464) 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 
months 
-.315 
(.215) 
.279 
(.304) 
-.626
**
 
(.306) 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months .360
**
 
(.155) 
.429
**
 
(.196) 
.330 
(.267) 
Worked in another organisation or association last 
12 months 
-.236 
(.314) 
-.182 
(.381) 
-.578 
(.584) 
Generalized and institutional trust        
Most people can be trusted or you can't be too 
careful 
-.004 
(.020) 
.008 
(.026) 
-.029 
(.033) 
Trust in country's parliament -.008 
(.025) 
.003 
(.032) 
-.020 
(.044) 
Trust in the legal system .065
***
 
(.025) 
.062
*
 
(.034) 
.066
*
 
(.036) 
Trust in the police -.058
***
 
(.022) 
-.077
**
 
(.031) 
-.039 
(.032) 
Trust in the European Parliament -.055
*
 
(.030) 
-.074
**
 
(.038) 
-.019 
(.053) 
Trust in the United Nations .066
***
 
(.027) 
.087
***
 
(.032) 
.041 
(.051) 
Time 
wave 1 2002 
 
.003 
(.154) 
 
wave 2 2006 
 
-.049 
(.157) 
 
wave 5 2011 .546
***
 
(.110) 
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Summary statistics        
N 5,236 3,691 1,545 
-2LL 3,451.072 2,050.619 1,353.761 
Cox & Snell R
2
 .104 .088 .117 
Nagelkerke R
2
 .195 .185 .185 
Hosmer & Lemeshow χ2Test 5.478 
p=.705 
7.671 
p=.466 
17.769 
p =.023 
Correctly predicted  87.0 90.1 80.8 
Source: Own calculations bassed on non-missing observations. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Odds ratios of the probbility of voting turnout.    
 Model 1. 
2002-2011 
Model 2. 
2002-2008 
Model 3. 
2011 
Variable  Exp(b) Exp(b) Exp(b) 
Intercept   15.622 30.645 13.927 
Socio-economic and demographic     
lnAge .449 .389 .541 
 lnEducation .791  .697 
Gender   1.349 
Children    .731 .642  
Lives with husband/wife/partner at household grid .591 .593 .582 
 Income   .921 1.078 
Income satisfaction  .908  .799 
Formal political participation    
Contacted politician or government official last 12 
months 
.600 .578 .518 
Latent political participation    
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties .304 .327 .242 
How interested in politics .816 .830 .787 
Activism     
Signed petition last 12 months  .359  
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 
months 
  .535 
Boycotted certain products last 12 months 1.433 1.535  
Generalized and Institutional Trust     
Trust in the legal system 1.067 1.064 1.068 
Trust in the police .944 .926  
Trust in the European Parliament .947 .929  
Trust in the United Nations 1.068 1.091  
Time    
wave 5 2011 1.726   
Source: Own calculations bassed on non-missing observations. Betas are reported 
only for the statistically signifcant variables of the models.  
